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would not appear to offer the defendant much relief since, in all
likelihood, the plaintiff would again refuse to answer the questions.
Although the court did not discuss whether defendant could have
appealed by permission, it would seem that the court would deny
such permission, and require the defendant to follow the suggested
procedure.6 0
To be compared with Tri-State is Presti v. Schalck.6' There
the appellate division, fourth department, held that while an appeal
from an order under CPLR 3124, compelling plaintiffs to answer
certain questions and make full disclosure of all matters pertaining
to such questions, was not available as a matter of right, the order
was appealable by permission under CPLR 5701(c). The appeal
in that case was dismissed, however, because of the appellant's
failure to obtain the required permission to appeal.
The practitioner is cautioned to distinguish the practice followed in the different departments, at least until the Court of
Appeals resolves the question of whether orders or rulings made
upon objections at an examination before trial are appealable by
permission.
ARTICLE

32-

ACCELERATED

JUDGMENT

CPLR 3212: Summary judgment granted on an unpleaded
cause of action.
In Dampskibsselskabet Torm v. P. L. Thomas Paper Co.,' 2
the appellate division, first department, has granted summary
judgment on an unpleaded cause of action. The plaintiff, a common carrier by sea, sued a shipper and its forwarder, ostensibly,
for breach of contract. The parties had agreed that the final bill
for a series of shipments would reflect a ten per cent discount
on the total freight charges. Plaintiff sought to recover the
amount of the discount, reflected as "balance due" on the freight
due bill. In its motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted
evidence of a shipping conference, approved by the United States
Shipping Board and signed by the shipper, which fixed rates and
prohibited discounts to shippers. Also supporting the motion
was a "reference" to Section 16 of the Shipping Act of 1916 6,3
which makes it unlawful for a shipper or forwarder to obtain
IGThis conclusion would seem warranted by the court's reference to
Lee v. Cieinway Corp., supra note 57, which held that orders made at
examinations before trial were not appealable by permission under CPLR
5701 (c)'.
61 26 App. Div. 2d 793, 275 N.Y.S.2d 36 (4th Dep't 1966).
62 26 App. Div. 2d 347, 274 N.Y.S.2d 601 (lst Dep't 1966).
63 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1964).
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water transportation at less than otherwise applicable rates by
means of false billing. The court granted the motion, holding
the forwarder liable by reason of section 16.
On appeal, the shipper argued, inter alia, that the lower court
had erred in granting summary judgment on a cause of action
based upon section 16, which had not been pleaded by plaintiff
but had merely been referred to in support of the motion. The
court, however, noted that the plaintiff's motion had given notice
to the shipper of the statutory claim. Indeed, there could have
been no prejudice, for the shipper, in its affidavit in opposition
to the motion, denied the claim of false billing. Moreover, the4
court was obligated to take judicial notice of the law involved.
Even on appeal the court could have amended the complaint to
conform to the proof presented with the plaintiff's motion.
It has been frequently held that a cause of action not contemplated in the complaint but presented in support of a motion
cannot be made the basis of summary judgment.65 Nevertheless,
the court's opinion seems consistent with the intent of CPLR
3212(g), which permits any order which will aid in the disposition
of the action. The facts not being in dispute, the issues were
determined by a clearly applicable statute. If this alone was not
sufficient notice of an alternate theory to the defendants, plaintiff's reference to the statute was. Since there was no prejudice
or unfair surprise, summary judgment was proper.
CPLR 3212.: Partial suin'nary judgment available in the
Court of Claims.
While the Court of Claims has granted severance and an
immediate trial on the merits where it was apparent that no valid
defense was involved, it has explicitly refused to term this a
partial summary judgment. 66 However, a recent case, Vern Norton,
Inc. v. State,17 has held that partial summary judgment may be
granted in the Court of Claims.
Neither the Court of Claims Act nor the Rules of the Court
of Claims expressly provide for a summary judgment procedure.
Nevertheless, by virtue of Section 9(9) of the Court of Claims
Act, which states that except as otherwise provided "the practice
CPLR 4511.
E.g., Cohen v. City Co. of New York, 283 N.Y. 112, 27 N.E.2d 803
(1940); Potalski Int'l v. Hall's Boat Corp., 282 App. Div. 44, 122 N.Y.S2d
166 (3d Dep't 1953); Morrisey v. Toumaniantz, 27 Misc. 2d 309, 208
N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960).
66 Yonkers Contracting Co. v. State, 28 Misc. 2d 495, 218 N.Y.S.2d 159
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Poszuwert v. State, 192 Misc. 528, 78 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Ct. C.
1948).
67 27 App. Div. 2d 13, 275 N.Y.S.2d 564 (3d Dep't 1966).
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